Gottschalk v. Benson--The Supreme Court Takes a Hard Line on Software by Mandelbaum, Howard F.
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 47 
Number 4 Volume 47, May 1973, Number 4 Article 2 
August 2012 
Gottschalk v. Benson--The Supreme Court Takes a Hard Line on 
Software 
Howard F. Mandelbaum 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Mandelbaum, Howard F. (1973) "Gottschalk v. Benson--The Supreme Court Takes a Hard Line on 
Software," St. John's Law Review: Vol. 47 : No. 4 , Article 2. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol47/iss4/2 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
NOTES AND COMMENTS
GOTTSCHALK v. BENSON- THE SUPREME
COURT TAKES A HARD LINE
ON SOFTWARE
INTRODUCTION
Both the American patent system and the technology it has
fostered have come a long way since 1641 when the first patent to issue
on this continent was granted by the Massachusetts General Court.1
It is most unlikely that, when George Washington appeared before
the second session of the First Congress to urge passage of a patent
bill,2 he or any of the attending legislators considered the implications
of patent protection for computer software. Subsequent revisions of
the Patent Act, through the currently applicable 1952 version, have not
expressly addressed that issue. The most thorough study of the matter
to date, that of the President's Commission on the Patent System, called
for statutory exclusion of computer programs from the protected sub-
ject matter contemplated by the Patent Act, but this recommendation
has failed to win congressional approval.3 Thus, the burden of estab-
lishing policy in this area of the law has, by default, been thrust upon
the courts.
The recent case of Gottschalk v. Benson4 represented the Supreme
Court's first opportunity to grapple with the issue of software5 patent-
ability. The 6-0 decision6 reversed a unanimous Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals (CCPA)7 and refused to grant patent protection to a
I In 1641, Samuel Winslow received this first American patent for a new method of
making salt. Unlike today's patents which are routinely issued under the patent laws, a
colonial patent like Winslow's was only granted following a special appeal by the inventor
to his colony's governing body. PHAItACEUTICAL MANUFAcrURERs ASS'N, THE STORY OF THE
UNITED STATEs PATENT OsrIcE at iv (1965).
2 On January 28, 1790, President Washington stated to the Congress:
I cannot forbear intimating to you the expediency of giving effectual encour-
agement as well to the introduction of new and useful inventions from abroad, as
to the exertions of skill and genius in producing them at home ....
Id. at i.
3 See note 116 infra.
4409 U.S. 63 (1972).
5 "Software" includes "the programs, data, routines, etc., for use in a digital computer,
as distinguished from the physical components." Wms-rt's NEW WoRLD DICTIONARY 1353
(2d College ed. 1968).
o Justices Stewart, Blackmun, and Powell did not participate in the decision. Mr. Justice
Douglas delivered the majority and sole opinion.
7 In re Benson, 441 F.2d 682 (C.C.P.A. 1971). Under the current patent laws, an inven-
tor whose patent application has been denied by the United States Board of Patent Appeals
may appeal the decision to the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (35
635
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"process"" by which a quantity expressed in one numerical system could
be transformed into its equivalent in another.9 Benson's reversal of the
U.S.C. § 141 (1970)) or, in the alternative, may bring a civil action against the Commis-
sioner in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (35 U.S.C. § 145
(1970)). Virtually all of the recent cases involving software patentability have taken the
first route of appeal.
835 U.S.C. § 100(b) (1970) provides:
The term 'process' means process, art or method, and includes a new use of a
known process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or material.
9 The process provided for the conversion of numbers expressed in binary coded deci-
mal (BOD) to pure binary form. In both BCD and pure binary, all numbers are repre-
sented by suitable arrangements of the digits "0" and "1." Unlike the commonly used
decimal system which utilizes the digits zero through nine to multiply successive powers
of 10, the binary system uses only the digits zero and one to multiply successive powers
of two.
Consider the following representation of the number nineteen hundred seventy-three
in both the decimal (not to be confused with binary coded decimal) and binary systems.
I) Decimal representation:
108=1000 102=100 101=10 100=1
1 9 7 3






210=1024 29=512 28=256 27=128 26=64 25=32 24=16 23=8 22=4 21=2 20=1
1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1
Proof: 1 X 1024 = 1024
1X 512=+512
1 X 256 = +256
1 X 128= +128
OX 64=+ 0
lX 32= + 32






BCD is a hybrid of both the decimal and binary systems. Like decimal, the digits zero
through nine multiply powers of 10 to yield the desired number. However, the individual
digits of the number are expressed in binary form. Thus the decimal number 1973 is writ-
ten in BCD by expressing each of the digits "1," "9," "7," and "8" as a four digit binary
number.
3) BCD representation:
23=8 22=4 21=2 20=1 02=8 22=4 21=2 20=1
0 0 0 1P 1 0 0 1
Proof:
[Vol. 47:635
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CGPA (which had itself overturned a Board of Patent Appeals' denial
of the patent) also placed in question a line of precedents that had
constituted the most authoritative source of law on the subject.10 The
decision was an economic victory for computer manufacturers over
software producers." Although the Court did not completely close the





23=8 22=4 21=2 20=1 '23=8 22=4 21=2 20=1
0 1 1 1 21 0 0 1 1
Proof:





The use of a two digit number system like binary is extremely advantageous in com-
puter design, since the relatively simple operation of switching an electrical device on and
off can be used to indicate each binary digit (commonly referred to as "bit"). Hence, "on"
may represent one and "off" would then represent zero. If a sufficient number of these
switching devices are strung together, any number can then be represented by switching
"on" those devices corresponding to each bit position containing a one, and switching "off"
those devices which stand for zero. To achieve the same result in decimal would require a
string of electrical devices each capable of being switched to 10 different states instead of
only two, "on" and "off."
Numbers stored in a digital computer in binary form may be added, multiplied, etc.,
according to the laws of binary arithmetic, by successive switching operations. The inven-
tion in the instant case addressed the problem of converting telephone numbers, dialed one
digit at a time, into the binary form necessary for the achievement of a telephone inter-
connection. Each digit, when dialed, generated electrical impulses which caused it to be
stored in binary form. Thus, after all the digits had been dialed, the overall telephone
number was stored in BCD, i.e., each decimal digit was represented by its binary equivalent.
A process by which this BCD representation could be converted to pure binary was needed
so that it could be processed in accordance with other telephone processing routines. The
purpose of the invention was to accomplish the conversion from BCD to binary, using a
minimum of electrical equipment. Brief for Respondent at 5-8, Gottschalk v. Benson, 409
U.S. 63 (1972).
10 See, e.g., cases discussed at notes 33-82 and accompanying text infra.
11 Among the 16 interested organizations filing amicus briefs in Benson were Honey-
well Inc., Burroughs Corp., I.B.M., Inc., Institutional Networks Corp., Computer Software
Analysts Inc., Computerized Lists Corp., Whitlow Computer Systems, Inc., Iowa State Uni-
versity Research Foundation, Inc., Business Equipment Manufacturer's Association, The
Information Industry Association, Applied Data Research, Inc., and Data Processing Service
Organizations, Software Products and Service Section. 409 U.S. at 63-64.
Programming consulting firms have attempted to market their own software in com-
petition with the hardware manufacturers. See Software Gets a Hardsell Approach, Bust-
NEss WEEK, Oct. 21, 1967, at 171. Lack of patent protection has been a major obstacle to
this endeavor. Therefore, software houses have been lobbying for software patent protec-
tion legislation. Id. at 178.
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door to software patentability,12 the programmer-inventor is likely to
encounter a more confident opposition the next time he attempts to
traverse a Patent Office rejection.
Unlike the typical issue of patentability which centers on disputed
novelty, utility or unobviousness, 13 the question posed in Benson was
more fundamental - viz., whether the subject matter for which the
patent was sought conformed to one of the five categories of invention
enumerated in the Patent Act.14 The respondents referred to their
invention as a "process," one of the classifications recognized by the
current patent statute.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The problem sought to be resolved in Benson originated long before
terms such as "digital computer" and "software" became a part of the
American vocabulary. The grandfather of the cases on process patent-
ability dealt with a technology of far lesser complexity than that
giving rise to the computer revolution. Samuel Morse's application for
a patent on the telegraph provided the Court with its first significant
opportunity to define the limits of patentable processes. In O'Reilly v.
Morse,15 the inventor's failure to limit to a specific apparatus his eighth
claim,16 by which he sought a process patent on the use of electro-
magnetism for transmitting intelligible characters, proved to be a fatal
overbreadth.17 Subsequently, The Telephone Cases'" distinguished
between Alexander Graham Bell's process claims which were confined
to execution on specific electrical apparatus and Morse's which had
12 Justice Douglas stated:
It is said that the decision precludes a patent for any program servicing a com-
puter. We do not so hold.
409 U.S. at 71.
13 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-03 (1970).
14 In addition to the requirements of novelty and utility, section 101 also recites five
categories of patentable subject matter to which a patentable invention must conform,
viz., process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or improvement thereof. 35
U.S.C. § 101 (1970). The Benson respondent applied for a process patent.
15 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1853).
16 The body of a patent application and resulting patent, if issued, comprise the speci-
fication. The specification includes a disclosure, wherein the inventor explains the workings
of his invention, followed by one or more claims which enumerate the specific attributes
of the invention to which the 17-year patent monopoly is to apply. See 35 U.S.C. § 112
(1970); 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.71, 1.75 (1972). Although the disclosure limits the scope of the claims,
it is the latter which defines the rights of the patentee.
1756 U.S. (15 How.) at 113-14, 117-20.
18 126 U.S. 1 (1887). These cases involved appeals from six infringement actions brought
by the American Bell Telephone Company against various alleged infringers. American Bell
Telephone was the assignee of two patents originally granted to Alexander Graham Bell
for telegraphy and telephony, respectively. Cf. 35 U.S.C. § 152 (1970).
[Vol. 47:635
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included no such restriction."2 Although this criterion for process
patentability is partially valid today, subsequent cases, as will be seen,
have provided alternatives to it.
The Court's concern with limiting the scope of process claims can
be traced to the enabling authority for the patent system itself. "[T]o
promote the Progress of Science. . . ,"20 the framers of the Constitution
provided for limited monopolies to inventors in return for public dis-
closure of their discoveries. Congress, in exercising the discretion
granted it by this constitutional provision, and the courts, in inter-
preting the resulting patent laws, were prudent to limit, both in dura-
tion21 and scope, 22 the legal monopolies authorized. The line had to be
carefully drawn. Too liberal a grant of the right to exclude all others
from capitalizing on a discovery would tip the scales and retard, rather
than promote, science. A denial of access to information rightfully be-
longing in the public domain would be totally antithetical to the objec-
tives of the constitutional framers. What more blatant abuse of the
patent power could be iiaagined than the grant of a legal monopoly
on the exercise of an individual's thought processes?
The Mental Process Doctrine
Recognition of this potential for abuse gave rise to the "mental
steps" or "mental process" doctrine.23 An analysis by which certain
processes performed solely or substantially by the human mind are
excluded from the statutory scheme of patentable subject matter was
first formulated and applied by the Patent Office and later by the
courts. Although the doctrine's origin can be traced as far back as
the turn of the century, it has not yet ripened sufficiently to be capable
of clear and certain application.24 On the contrary, until Benson, the
19 126 U.S. at 534-35.
20 U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 8.
21 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 154, 173 (1970).
22 In addition to the statutory classifications of patentable subject matter (35 U.S.C.
§ 101 (1970)), the court-created doctrine of patent misuse has also placed limits on the scope
of the patent monopoly. This doctrine seeks to prevent a patentee from requiring the
licensing, purchase or lease of unpatented items as a condition to acquisition of similar
rights in a patented item. Patent misuse may be asserted as a defense to an infringement
action or may itself be the basis of an antitrust suit. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine
Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 136 (1969); Stearns v. Tinker & Rasor, 252 F.2d 589, 600-05
(9th Cir. 1957); Laitram Corp. v. King Crab, Inc., 245 F. Supp. 1019 (D. Alas. 1965)..
23 For an extensive examination of the development of the mental process doctrine,
see McClaskey, The Mental Process Doctrine: Its Origin, Legal Basis, and Scope, 55 IowA
L. REV. 1148 (1970).
24 Ihe question of whether a step in a process is mental or physical seems to us
to be one of fact rather than one of law and so should not be difficult of determi-
nation, but opinions sometimes differ even as to facts.
1973]
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doctrine had undergone considerable erosion in the Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals.
Among the first of the mental process applications to come before
the Commissioner of Patents was Ex parte Meinhardt.25 The inventor
had devised a system for determining the width and spacing of lettering
to be altered in height so as to maintain the previous proportions of the
writing. The Commissioner denied the application, finding that the
invention was neither a process nor an art.28 On rehearing, the Com-
missioner said:
It is conceivable that some persons after long and arduous study
might discover a new method for solving certain mathematical
problems which was much simpler and shorter than any known
method; but such method would not be a proper subject for a
patent. So, in the present case, applicant's plan, no matter what
its merit, does not come within the classes for which protection can
be secured under the patent laws.2 7
Had the Benson claim which dealt with execution of the conversion
process on a re-entrant shift register been brought before the same Com-
missioner, it is not improbable that the same response would have been
elicited. However, the Benson disclosure taught a process for solving
a mathematical problem - viz., converting binary coded decimal (BCD)
numbers to binary, in a simplified way, i.e., with less computer hard-
ware than would otherwise be required.2 8 Unlike the Meinhardt claims,
In re Abrams, 188 F.2d 165, 168 (C.C.P.A. 1951).
The appellant in Abrams suggested the following cookbook recipe for applying the
mental steps doctrine:
1. If all the steps of a method claim are purely mental in character, the sub-ject matter thereof is not patentable within the meaning of the patent statutes.
2. If a method claim embodies both positive and physical steps as well as
so-called mental steps, yet the alleged novelty or advance over the art resides in one
or more of the so-called mental steps then the claim is considered unpatentable
for the same reason that it would be if all the steps were purely mental in char-
acter.
3. If a method claim embodies both positive and physical steps as well as
so-called mental steps, yet the novelty or advance over the art resides in one or
more of the positive and physical steps and the so-called mental step or steps are
incidental parts of the process which are essential to define, qualify or limit its
scope, then the claim is patentable and not subject to the objection contained in
I and 2 above.
Id. at 166.
The Abrams court expressly declined either to adopt or reject this formula, but noted
that it was consistent with prior case law. Furthermore, the Court noted that, even if it
were to apply the suggested test, petitioner would fail since he fell under rule 2 rather than
rule 3. Id. at 167-73. Subsequently, the Board of Patent Appeals relied on and applied
these rules in a number of cases. See In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882, 886 (C.C.P.A. 1970),
where the CCPA again disavowed adoption of these rules.
25 1907 Dec. Com. Pat. 237, af'd on rehearing, 1907 Dec. Com. Pat. 238.
26 1907 Dec. Com. Pat. at 238.
27 Id. at 239.
28 See note 104 and accompanying text infra.
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Benson's were associated with the operation of a particular apparatus,
a digital computer. As will be shown, the significance of this distinc-
tion proved to be the source of great conflict between the Patent Office
and the CCPA prior to Benson.
The development of the mental process doctrine subsequent to
Meinhardt was not confined to processes for the solution of mathemati-
cal problems. It was later associated with the rejection of patents for:
a method of testing electrical insulators where mental comparisons of
the results were essential to their evaluation; a process whereby light
could be modulated by music to produce an aesthetically pleasing
effect;80 and a method of preventing seasickness by a prescribed manner
of mental concentration.3'
The doctrine still retained its vitality in 195132 when In re
Abrams3s was decided by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals.
Here, a method for prospecting petroleum was the subject of a rejected
patent application. The process consisted of drilling holes in the ground
to be prospected, evacuating the air from within, and then measuring
the rate of pressure increase in the holes caused by gas emissions from
underground petroleum deposits. After this physical phase, mental
computations were to be performed on the measured data to determine
whether there was sufficient petroleum to render extraction feasible. 34
Finding that the novelty of the invention resided in the mental rather
that the physical phase of the process, the court affirmed the opinion
of the Board of Appeals of the United States Patent Office in dis-
allowing the claims in issue.3 5
In re Shao Wen Yuan, 6 decided by the same court thereafter,
29 Johnson v. Duquesne Light Co., 29 F.2d 784 (W.D. Pa. 1928).
30 Greenewalt v. Stanley Co. of America, 54 F.2d 195 (1931).
31 Ex parte Mayne, 59 U.S.P.Q. 342 (P.O.B.A. 1942).
32 Among the pre-1951 cases which reinforced the mental process doctrine were, in
chronological order: Don Lee, Inc. v. Walker, 61 F.2d 58 (9th Cir. 1932) (patent for improve-
ment, based on computation, in method of counterbalancing engine main shafts invalid as
non-statutory subject matter and as anticipated by prior art); In re Bolongoro, 62 F.2d
1059 (C.C.P.A. 1933) (mathematical method used for printing publications from manu-
scripts not patentable subject matter); In re Cooper, 134 F.2d 630 (C.C.P.A. 1943) (formula
for determining carbon content of steel not statutory subject matter); Halliburton Oil Well
Cementing Co. v. Walker, 146 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1944), rex'd on other grounds, 329 U.S. 1
(1946) (mathematical method of finding an obstruction in a well used mental steps and
was unpatentable); In re Heritage, 150 F.2d 554 (C.C.P.A. 1945) (mental process for choosing
proper quantity of fiber board coating material not patentable).
33 188 F.2d 165 (C.C.P.A. 1951).
34 Id. at 170.
The determination of the amount of petroleum available was achieved either by cal-
culations based on application of the gas laws or, in some cases, by graphical extrapolation
techniques. Id.
35 Id.
36 188 F.2d 377 (C.C.PA. 1951).
1973]
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involved an attempt to patent a means of determining the dimensions
of an air foil.37 The inventor had developed a mathematical formula
which would yield the dimensions from parameters indicative of the
desired aerodynamic characteristics.35 Unlike the holdings in Morse and
The Telephone Cases which turned on the presence or absence of a
physical process-implementing apparatus,3 9 the Shao Wen Yuan court
held that a patentable process must be performed on physical matter so
as to alter its state.40 Finding this alternative prerequisite unsatisfied
here in the case at bar, the court sustained the Patent Office rejection
under the mental process doctrine.41
Erosion of the Doctrine
Neither of the applications at issue in Abrams and Shao Wen Yuan
disclosed a mechanical apparatus by which their claimed processes
could be executed absent human intervention. Thus, when, in 1969,
the CCPA decided In re Prater,42 it found the previous two cases to be
non-controlling.43 The Prater application was for a patent on a quanti-
tative spectrographic analysis process. 44 A method of processing the
resultant data by computer, without human intervention, was dis-
closed.45 Notwithstanding this departure from the facts present in
Abrams and Shao Wen Yuan, the Prater court affirmed the Patent
Office's rejection of the process claims since the process as performed
on the mechanical apparatus had not been claimed.46 Absent express
provisions in the relevant process claims limiting their application to
specified mechanical means of analyzing the data, description in the
patent disclosure of such means would not remove the claims from the
mental process prohibition.
37 Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1966) defines an "air foil" as
a body (as an airplane wing or propeller blade) designed to provide a desired re-
action force when in motion relative to the surrounding air.
38 188 F.2d at 378.
39 See notes 15-19 and accompanying text supra.
40 188 F.2d at 381.
41 Id. at 383.
42415 F.2d 1393 (C.C.P.A. 1969), modifying 415 F.2d 1378 (C.C.P.A. 1968). The Prater
decision has been the subject of much comment. See, e.g., Annot., 6 A.L.R. FED. 156 (1971);
Popper, Prater 11, 19 AM. U.L. REv. 25 (1969); Sutton, The "Mental Steps" Doctrine: A
Critical Analysis in the Light of Prater and Wei, 52 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 479 (1970); Comment,
In re Prater and Patent Reform Proposals: 'Debugging' the Patent Office's Administration
of Computer Program Applications, 18 CATHOLIC U.L. REV. 389 (1969), reprinted, 51 J.
PAT. Or. Soc'Y 581 (1969); Comment, Mathematics, Computers, and In re Prater: The
Medium and the Message, 58 GEo. L.J. 391 (1969); 4 GA. L. REv. 404 (1970); 48 TEXAS L.
Rav. 971 (1970); 7 DUQUESNE L. REv. 482 (1969).
43 415 F.2d at 1401-03.
44 Id. at 1395.
45 Id. at 1403. The court noted that the disclosure was of a patentable process. Id.
46 Id. at 1403-05.
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Although disclosure of all subject matter claimed is a prerequisite
to a patent, the disclosure will not be read into a claim, not otherwise
sufficiently limited, so as to save it from rejection as a mental process. 47
Thus, although the CCPA intimated in Prater that a process limited to
execution on a computer might be patentable under section 101,48 it
expressly declined to decide the issue, relying instead on the insuffi-
ciency of the claim, as drafted, under section 112.49 Nevertheless, the
court had provided what appeared to be the key to patenting a com-
puter process.
The deficiency in the Prater claims was avoided in In re Bern-
hart,50 resulting in allowance of an otherwise similar process claim.
Bernhart involved a process by which a three-dimensional object could
be portrayed in two dimensions from any desired viewing angle.51 The
process consisted of programming a digital computer to operate on
the coordinates of a three-dimensional object in accordance with a
prescribed mathematical formula. The results, then in the form of
electrical impulses, were relayed to a mechanical plotter which drew
the desired two-dimensional representation. Although the process could
theoretically be performed by an unaided human being,52 express
provision in the claims for use of a digital computer and plotting ap-
paratus avoided rejection as a mental process.0 Furthermore, the
Bernhart court decided the issue it had previously sidestepped in
47 Id. at 1403-04.
48 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1970) provides:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufac-
ture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may
obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.
Cf. note 14 supra.
49 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1970) provides:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of
the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, dear, concise, and
exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with
which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth
the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing
out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his
invention....
An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step
for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or
acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the correspond-
ing structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents
thereof.
50 417 F.2d 1395 (C.C.PA. 1969).
51Id. at 1396.
52 As a practical matter, manual computations would be quite burdensome when
applied to complex three-dimensional forms. Therefore, the ability to achieve the two-
dimensional representation without human intervention was a significant development.
53 417 F.2d at 1401.
Three claims in the application which did not pass muster were rejected for lack of
novelty and not for failure to conform to the criteria for statutory subject matter.
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Prater, viz., whether a mathematical process performed on a mechanical
device would qualify as patentable subject matter under section 101 of
the statute. The question was answered in the affirmative. 4
Having opened the doors to computer process patents, the CGPA
proceeded to liberally refine the criteria it had promulgated. In re
Mahony"5 obviated the need for express reference to a mechanical
device in a process claim where the process was inherently limited
to execution on such apparatus (notwithstanding that it could be
simulated by a mental process). The application claimed a process for
selecting whole "words" of information from a continuous stream of
electrical impulses, i.e., a method of identifying the beginning and end
of each word.5  The bits of information constituting the letters of a
word were characteristically represented in writing by zeros and ones
and the method described could be simulated by a human using pencil
and paper. The court found that the Patent Office had confused the
process, which was inherently restricted to electrical impulses and could
not be humanly performed, with a symbolic simulation of the process
achievable by mental steps. 57 Since the applicant had attempted to
patent the former and not the latter, the subject matter could not be
excluded under the mental process doctrine.55
In re Musgrave59 approved a claim for processing seismic data ex-
pressed as signals notwithstanding the fact that the same information
could be processed by mental steps.50 This case dealt a serious blow to
the already eroded mental process doctrine.61
Possibly seeking to soften the effect of its holding in Musgrave,
the CCPA qualified the earlier decision when dealing with a similar
process in In re Foster.62 The court noted that the broad definition of
the term "signals" encompasses "visible patterns which may be sub-
54 Id.
55 421 F.2d 742 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
56 Consider an alphabet of only two letters and no provision for spaces. A sentence of
words written with this alphabet would appear as a continuous stream of letters. In order
to receive the information contained in the sentence, one would have to be able to group
the letters into the words they represent. This is the situation encountered in a simple elec-
tronic data processor wherein devices are switched "on" to represent one bit of the two-bit
alphabet and "off" to represent the other.
The invention claimed by Mahony provided a method for using the bits to perform
the function of spaces between the words as well as letters of the words. The invention
included a synchronizing circuit for differentiating between letter bits and space bits.
See 421 F.2d at 743.
57 421 F.2d at 746.
58 Id. at 747.
59431 F.2d 882 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
6o Id. at 893.
61 Id. at 895 (Baldwin, J., concurring).
62438 F.2d 1011 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
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jected to manual manipulation." 3 It therefore disallowed claims
couched in terms of "signals" while allowing those that referred to
"electrical signals," the latter being incapable of manual manipula-
tion.614
In re Benson and the CCPA
It was against the background of this liberal trend that the CCPA
entertained an appeal from the Patent Board of Appeals' rejection of
Benson's claims 865 and 1366 for a process whereby numbers expressed
in BCD form could be converted to pure binary.67 Judge Rich, writing
63 Id. at 1061.
64 Id.
05 Claim 8, the first of the two claims considered, read as follows:
The method of converting signals from binary coded decimal form into binary
which comprises the steps of-
(1) storing the binary coded decimal signals in a re-entrant shift register,
(2) shifting the signals to the right by at least three places, until there is a
binary '' in the second position of said register,
(3) masking out said binary '1' in said second position of said register,
(4) adding a binary '1' to the first position of said register,
(5) shifting the signals to the left by two positions,
(6) adding a '1' to said first position, and
(7) shifting the signals to the right by at least three positions in preparation
for a succeeding binary '1' in the second position of said register.
409 U.S. at 73-74.
66 Claim 13 read:
A data processing method for converting binary coded decimal number repre-
sentations into binary number representations comprising the steps of-
(1) testing each binary digit position '1,' beginning with the least significant
binary digit position, of the most significant decimal digit representation for a
binary '0' or a binary '1';
(2) if a binary '0' is detected, repeating step (1) for the next least significant
binary digit position of said most significant decimal digit representation;
(3) if a binary '1' is detected, adding a binary '1' at the (i + 1)th and (i + 3)th
least significant binary digit positions of the next lesser significant decimal digit
representation, and repeating step (1) for the next least significant binary digit
position of said most significant decimal digit representation;
(4) upon exhausting the binary digit positions of said most significant decimal
digit representation, repeating steps (1) through (3) for the next lesser significant
decimal digit representation as modified by the previous execution of steps (1)
through (3); and
(5) repeating steps (1) through (4) until the second least significant decimal
digit representation has been so processed.
409 U.S. at 74.
67 As an illustration of the methods claimed, consider the conversion of the ordinary
decimal number 53 from BCD to binary. Note that 53 in BCD is 5 in binary, written
to the left of 3 in binary:
(5) (3)
23=8 22=4 21=2 20=1 23=8 22=4 21=2 20=1
0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1
Taking claim 8 first (see note 65 supra):
1) the BCD representation above is stored in a re-entrant shift register. A re-entrant
shift register is a device which stores individual bit signals (represented by "0" and "I"
above) and allows all bits to be simultaneously shifted to the right or left so that as bits
are pushed out of one side of the register they re-enter the other side in the same order.
See Brief for Respondent at 7 n.8, Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972). For our exam.
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pie, consider an eight position shift register, i.e., one capable of storing eight bits, the
amount needed to represent any two-digit decimal number. The BCD representation of
53 appears in the re-entrant shift register as:
0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1
2) shifting the digits to the right at least three places until there is a binary '1' in the
second position yields the following configuration:
First shift: 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1
Second shift: 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0
Third shift: 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0
Since three shifts have been made and there is now a binary '1' in the second position
(from the right) no further shifts are necessary at this time. Were there a '0' in that posi-
tion shifting would continue until a '1' occupied it.
3) masking out the binary '1' in the second position is equivalent to changing it to
a '0'. This leaves:
x
01101000
4) adding a binary '1' to the first position gives:
x
0 10 1 001
5) shifting the signals to the left by two positions:
First shift: 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0
Second shift: 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1
6) adding a 'l' to the first position:
x
1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0
Note: in binary arithmetic 1 + 1 = 1 0
7) shifting to the right by at least three places as in step 2 until there is a '1' in the
second position:
First shift: 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1
Second shift: 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1
Third shift: 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0
Fourth shift: 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0
There is now a '1' in the second position. Now complete the second cycle from step 3
onward.
3') mask out the second position.
x
0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0
4') add a binary '1' to the first position.
x
0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1
5') shift to the left by two positions.
First shift: 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0
Second shift: 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1
6') add a '1' to the first position.
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for a unanimous panel in In re Benson68 reversed the Board of Appeals
and held that the claims concerned patentable subject matter. 9 The
Benson claims were said to have fallen prey to the same "blanket Patent
Office policy" 70 that had instigated similar rejections in Prater, Bern-
x
1 0 1001 10
7') since the net number of shifts since step 1 was three to the right (steps 2, 5, 7 and
5') shift three to the left or five to the right to reach the final result.
First shift: 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1
Second shift: 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1
Third shift: 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0
Fourth shift: 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0
Fifth shift: 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1
The bit representation appearing in the register after the fifth shift to the right is 53 in
binary notation; 25 + 24 + 22 + 20.
Claim 13 claims the same basic technique but accomplishes the conversion without
shifting the digits in a shift register. No specific apparatus is named in claim 13. Following
the steps in claim 13, start with the BCD representation of 53:
(5) I (3)
0 1 0 1 10 0 1 1
1) test each bit of the most significant digit (5) for a '0' or a 'I'.
x x [
0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1
2) a '1' is found in the first and third bits of the most significant digit (5 = 0101).
Therefore i = 1 and 3.
3) add a binary '1' at the (i + 1) th and (i + 3) th, i.e., second and fourth positions for
i = 1, and fourth and sixth positions for i = 3, of the next lesser significant digit (3 = 0011):
0 0 1 1
1 0 1 0
1 0 1 0 0 0
1 1 0 1 0 1
4) since the second least significant digit (5) has been processed, the result of step 3
is the end result. See Brief for Appellant at 8a - 13a, Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63
(1972).
68441 F.2d 682 (C.C.P.A. 1971). In addition to Judge Rich, the court included Judges
Almond, Baldwin and Lane of the CCPA and Judge Re of the United States Customs
Court, who sat by designation. Id.
89 Id. at 688.
70 Id. at 686. Patent Office policy regarding software applications has been subject to
modification. On August 16, 1966, Commissioner Brenner published Guidelines to Examina-
tion of Programs. Citing Abrams and Shao Wen Yuan, the Commissioner declared that
mathematical formulas were not section 101 subject matter. However, a distinction was
made between "algorithm and utility processes," the former lying outside the scope of
section 101 but the latter included in it. 829 OFFicIL GAzLrr 865, 865-66 (1966) [herein-
after cited as 1966 Guidelines].
On October 22, 1968, two years after a hearing on the 1966 guidelines, the same
Commissioner published Guidelines to Examination of Applications for Patents on Com-
puter Programs. Again citing Abrams and Shao Wen Yuan, this new and abbreviated
guideline deleted the former algorithm versus utility distinction. The only exception
provided for was an information-producing routine which was combined with the physical
1973]
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hart, Mahony, Musgrave and Foster. However, the court distinguished
In re Benson as presenting an additional problem. In the earlier cases,
the data processing art to be patented was claimed in support of a specific
and supplementary technical art. Benson's claims for a data processing
art stood entirely alone- 1 Notwithstanding this difference, the court
found sufficient precedent in Mahony and Musgrave to uphold the
first of the claims in issue.7 2 Claim eight provided for performance of the
conversion process via a re-entrant shift register, i.e., the claim was con-
fined to performance on a specific piece of hardware.73 Furthermore,
the court found that the claim's reference to "signals," in the context
presented, was inherently limited to electrical signals processed by the
hardware described, thereby eliminating any need to expressly desig-
nate the signals as "electrical." 74 Although claim 13 was framed in more
abstract terminology and made reference to no mechanical imple-
menting device, it was nevertheless upheld under a pragmatic analysis.
By determining that the claimed process had "no practical use other
than the more effective operation and utilization of a machine known
as a digital computer,"75 the court was able to reason that the subject
matter claimed must be a useful art76 and therefore within the ambit
of the patent statute.77
The CCPA, Post In Re Benson
Three weeks after this decision which was to finally bring the soft.
ware patentability issue before the Supreme Court, the CCPA, in In re
Mcllroy,78 affirmed its Benson stance and reversed a Board of Appeals'
rejection of claims for a method of retrieving symbolic data in a digi-
tal computer. Relying on the useful arts doctrine promulgated in
steps of a process that appreciably changed the character or condition of physical materials.
855 OrFiclAlx GAzEr 829, 829-30 (1968) [hereinafter cited as 1968 Guidelines].
71441 F.2d at 686.
72 Id. at 687.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 688.
76 Originally appearing in the constitutional authorization for patent grants, the useful
arts criterion had come full circle. The first United States patent act provided for patents
on inventions or discoveries of any "useful art, manufacture, engine, machine, or device, or
any improvement therein .. " Act of April 10, 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109, 110. The
term "useful art" was retained throughout the numerous revisions of the statute until
enactment of the 1952 version wherein the term "process" was substituted for "art" among
the categories of patentable subject matter. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1970) (Reviser's Note).
In Musgrave, however, Judge Rich preferred to speak in terms of a "useful arts" test which
was also deemed synonymous with "technological arts" in determining statutory subject
matter. The same test was applied in In re Benson. See note 82 infra.
77 441 F.2d at 688.
78442 F.2d 1397 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
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Benson, the CCPA found the subject matter of the claims patentable
under section 101. 79 The court also reiterated the position it had taken
in Musgrave that "machine implementation versus mental imple-
mentation is not a determinative dichotomy in deciding whether a
method is statutory under 35 U.S.C. § 101."110
Pending the Benson appeal, the mental steps doctrine as applied
to computer processes was dealt a final blow before its revival by the
Supreme Court. In re Waldbaum8t was the last of a line of CCPA cases
to uphold software claims as within the useful arts prior to the Su-
preme Court's landmark Benson decision. In Waldbaum, a method of
counting the number of "ones" in a data word was held to be patent-
able subject matter. Like McIlroy, this decision was supported by In
re Benson and Musgrave and turned on application of the useful arts
test.82
GOTT'SCHALK v. BENSON
On October 16, 1972, the Supreme Court convened to review the
CCPA's overturn of Patent Office rejections on claims 8 and 13 of
the Benson application.83
The respondent argued that the claims in question related only to
the machine process disclosed and were not intended to cover any other
application of the mathematical relationship, the latter being merely
incidental to the invention.84 Thus, the argument posed in favor of
the patent attacked the applicability rather than the validity of the
mental process doctrine.85
79 Id. at 1398.
80 ld.
81 457 F.2d 997 (C.C.P.A. 1972).
82Id. at 1003. Concurring in Waldbaum, Judge Rich took credit for originating the
"technological arts" or "useful arts" test. He was careful to note, however, that "[n~o new
legal concept was intended." Id.
83 Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972), revrg 441 F.2d 682 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
84 Brief for Respondent at 15, Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
85 The legal controversy surrounding the issue of software patentability was not, by any
means, the only problem facing the respondent in Benson. Numerous practical problems
were also present, including concern over the ability of the patent office to implement
classification and search procedures for software patents, a lack of technical expertise on
the part of judges who would be called on to adjudicate controversies concerning software
patents, and the effect of software patentability on the industries involved in the develop-
ment and utilization of computer software.
Fear was expressed that the enormous amount of software constantly being generated
would result in an unmanageable volume of prior art, thereby making determinations of
novelty and obviousness, prior to litigation, virtually impossible. See 409 U.S. at 72-73;
R PORT OF TH PRESMENT'S COMM'N ON THE PATENT SYSTEM, "To PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF
... UsEFuL ARTs," reprinted in S. Doc. No. 5, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1967) [hereinafter
cited as PRESIDENTS COMm'N]. However, the basis of these reservations has never been
conclusively established. On the contrary, the Patent Office, despite the problems it faces
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Paradoxically, the very premise relied on by the CCPA in up-
regarding search and classification of computer programs, has established a subclass for
computer software. See Bigelow, Legal Aspects of Proprietary Software, DATAmATION, Oct.,
1968, at 32, 33.
The Patent Office appears to be having its share of difficulties without the additional
burden of software patent applications. See Benett & Hess, The Crisis in Patents, MANAGE-
lmEN R~vxmw, May, 1967, at 64 [hereinafter cited as Crisis]. As of 1967, the average mini-
mum time to secure a patent was estimated to be "at least two to three years." Id. at 64.
The backlog problems of the United States Patent Office are not unique. Despite its
shortcomings, no other nation can claim a more efficient system. Nor has the problem been
neglected: The Patent Office has streamlined its procedures, personnel have been added,
and modern information storage and retrieval techniques utilizing computers and micro-
film have been adopted. Id. at 66. Yet the problem is overwhelming. In addition to the
numerous patent applications originating domestically, many foreign inventors seek the
protection of the United States patent laws. Id. at 64-65. Foreign patents may also be cited
as prior art against U.S. inventors, thereby barring patents to the latter for lack of novelty.
35 U.S.C. § 102 (1970).
The "Paris Convention," established in 1883, has discussed the feasibility of an inter-
national patent system to facilitate searches and eliminate the need for multiple filing in
order to serve multi-national patent protection. It has been predicted that:
Hovering over the world of tomorrow will be high capacity satellites
synchronized with large patent data processing and information storage systems.
Through a desk instrument the inventor and his patent attorney will be able to
submit their application to the international patent office. Within a matter of
days- not years- the inventor might be informed that his patent has been
filed and issued in Washington as well ,as in any other office adhering to the
world system.
Crisis at 68.
This optimism, however, does not seem to offer much consolation for the present.
And, absent these projected developments, the additional task of classifying and searching
software inventions, engendered by their inclusion in the realm of statutor/ subject matter,
appears to be more than the Patent Office would like to assume or the Court is willing to
thrust upon it. For a more down-to-earth analysis of the issues attending classification and
search of software patents, see Spencer, Retrieval of Programming Technology for Patent
Purposes, 52 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 125 (1970). In any event, the mere possibility of causing
some inconvenience to the Patent Office is hardly sufficient justification for the denial of
a right authorized by the Constitution and mandated by Congress.
Although not expressly mentioned in Benson, there have been previous acknowledge-
ments of the courts' limitations when called upon to adjudicate the highly technical issues
which attend patent litigation.
It is an old observation that the training of Anglo-American judges ill fits
them to discharge the duties cast upon them by patent legislation.
Marconi Wireless Telegraph Co. of America v. United States, 320 U.S. 1, 60-61 (1943)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
I cannot stop without calling attention to the extraordinary condition of the
law which makes it possible for a man without any knowledge of even the rudi-
ments of chemistry to pass upon such questions as these.
Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95, 115 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911), modified, 196 F.
496 (2d Cir. 1912).
While this problem applies to patent cases in general, the confusion is compounded
when the uncertainties of the mental process doctrine are invoked in the formulation of a
decision.
Although the amicus briefs of 16 interested groups were filed in Benson, the Court did
not expressly address itself to the consequences of software patents on the computer
industry. Nevertheless, the economic interests of the software developers in maintaining
exclsive control of their product versus the hardware manufacturers' desire to assure an
adequate supply of low cost processing routines for their machines presents a real issue.
See note 11 supra.
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holding claim 13s1 led the Supreme Court to the opposite conclusion
with respect to both claims.
The mathematical formula involved here has no substantial practi-
cal application except in connection with a digital computer,
which means that if the judgment below is affirmed, the patent
would wholly preempt the mathematical formula and in practical
effect would be a patent on the algorithm itself.87
At first glance, this reasoning appears diametrically opposed to that
which barred Samuel Morse's claims on the telegraph."8 Morse's claims
regarding the transmission of symbolic characters, unrestricted to any
specific apparatus, were invalidated as threatening to preempt the en-
tire field. However, the court's finding that the sole practical applica-
tion of the Benson discovery was in conjunction with a digital computer
was not an acknowledgment that the process was limited to perfor-
mance on a specific apparatus but was instead an assertion that its use on
a digital computer constituted the whole field.
Precedents in the Court
Having never before faced the issue of software patentability, the
Court looked to its early process patent cases. Despite the historical
emphasis on presence or absence of physical apparatus for imple-
menting a patentable process, a closer examination of these cases shows
this criterion to be merely one means of achieving a broader end, ade-
quate limitations on the scope of the monopoly sought.
The Benson Court qualified dicta from the 1853 case of Corning v.
Burden89 which had purported to eliminate the requirement that
a patentable process be confined to use in conjunction with a specific
machine. The examples cited in that case were deemed dependent on
definite chemical and physical processes and acts sufficiently limiting
to allay fears of unbounded monopoly.90 Thus, where an adequate sub-
stitute test served to limit the monopoly granted, the physical apparatus
requirement became dispensable.
86 See note 75 and accompanying text supra.
87 409 U.S. at 71-72.
88 See note 17 and accompanying text supra.
89 56 U.S. (15 How.) 252 (1853).
90 In Corning, the Court noted that useful improvements in certain processes may be
patented. Among the examples given were "[t]he arts of tanning, dyeing, making water-
proof cloth, vulcanizing India rubber [and] smelting ores." Id. at 267-68. The Benson
Court accounted for the classification of these processes as statutory subject matter by noting
that the physical and chemical phenomena by which raw materials were to be transformed
in these processes were sufficiently well defined so as to keep the scope of the patents within
manageable bounds. 409 U.S. at 69.
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In attempting to reconcile this reasoning with Cochran v. Dee-
ner,9 which required neither a specific executing apparatus nor a
limiting physical or chemical phenomenon, Benson reverted to the
physical product rationale. Cochran involved a patent on a process for
purifying flour. It consisted of three basic steps. First, the finest grains
of flour which were pure in themselves were removed. Second, the re-
maining mixture of coarse flour grains and impurities was separated by
blasts of air. Lastly, the separated course grains were finely ground and
recombined with the original fine grains.92 The process was not limited
to any specific apparatus nor was it limited in scope by any confining
chemical or physical phenomena. Nevertheless, the Cochran Court
affirmed the patentability of the process notwithstanding its noncompli-
ance with the formerly required criteria and noted that use of the pro-
cess by someone other than the patentee or his licensee, regardless of
the apparatus employed, would infringe the process patent.93
The Benson Court reasoned that Cochran was not an anomaly but
was grounded on a sound alternative basis for patentability which did
not support the claims in the instant case:
Transformation and reduction of an article "to a different state or
thing" is the clue to the patentability of a process claim that does
not include particular machines."
Since neither of the processes claimed in Benson resulted in a substan-
tive article or thing, the physical product rationale was inapplicable.
An Alternative to Software Process Patents
The Court expressly limited its holding to execution of the so-
called process on a general purpose digital computer,95 i.e., one which
can be universally programmed to perform various operations without
altering its inherent physical construction. The question then arises,
had a "hard-wired" machine been devised to convert BCD to binary
numbers on the basis of the discovered algorithm, said machine being
incapable of performing any other function, would a patent on it have
survived the scrutiny of the Court?
9194 U.S. 780 (1876).
92 Id. at 785.
93 Id. at 788.
94 409 U.S. at 70. The Court cited several of its earlier decisions respecting patents
involving processes whereby articles were changed to different states: Waxham v. Smith,
294 U.S. 20 (1935), and Smith v. Snow, 294 U.S. 1 (1935) (involving a process for artificially
hatching eggs); Expanded Metal Co. v. Bradford, 214 U.S. 366 (1909) (process for expanding
sheet metal solely by physical, as opposed to chemical, means was patentable); Tilghman v.
Proctor, 102 U.S. 707 (1880) (conversion of fatty bodies to glycerine and fat acids was a
patentable process).
o5 409 U.S. at 71.
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The Patent Office has issued approximately 75 apparatus patents
for means of transforming numbers between BCD and binary. 6 Pat-
ents have long been granted for machines capable of performing mathe-
matical operations, notwithstanding that the latter may be simulated
mentally with or without pencil and paper.97
Unlike process patents, those for machines have not been vulner-
able to the mental process doctrine. Aware of this, patent attorneys
more concerned with securing patents for the protection of their clients
than with challenging court-made dogma have been successful in sub-
stantially circumventing the problems attending mental processes. By
drafting claims to center on apparatus rather than processes, they have
secured the patenting of inventions founded on mathematical relation-
ships. Although these patents do not prevent use of the disclosed rela-
tionships via mental steps or with the aid of pencil and paper,
sufficiently broad descriptions of the apparatus claimed substantially
preclude their exploitation via almost any known mechanical
means.98 This is particularly significant since the complexity of many
of these relationships makes their mental use, although possible when
aided by pencil and paper, economically and practically unfeasible.
Furthermore, the protection offered by the apparatus patent is often
broader and therefore superior to that of a corresponding process
patent. With regard to the latter, the sequence of process steps enumer-
ated in the claims often narrows the scope of the patent. Thus, a
change in the sequence of steps or elimination of one or more steps
may result in a non-infringing use of the invention.
96 See, e.g., patent no. 3,500,883, issued to John W. Pross Jr., for Binary to Binary
Coded Decimal Conversion Apparatus; patent no. 3,505,675, issued to Thomas 0. Holtey,
for Converter for Binary and Binary-Coded Decimal Numbers; patent no. 3,535,498, issued
to Louis G. Smith, Jr., for Matrix of Binary Add-Subtract Arithmetic Units with Bypass
Control.
97 See, e.g., patent no. 627,791, issued to Gustav Zeidler in 1899, for Calculating
Machine; patent no. 140,146, issued to Gustavus Linderoos in 1873, for Adding Machines;
patent no. 137,107, issued to Archibald M. Stephenson in 1873, for Adding Machines.
98 See, e.g., patent no. 3,601,593, issued to Frank Preston, for Inverse Tangent Gener-
ator. This patent discloses a mathematical formula for computing the inverse tangent to
any required degree of accuracy. An electronic circuit capable of performing the computa-
tion is described. However, the invention is not limited to this circuit. On the contrary,
the circuit is specified as only one of several alternative means by which the computation
may be performed. This disclosure notes that the equations presented may be "mechanized
by a digital computer."
The first and broadest claim denotes a "function generator" composed of means for
computing various quantities used in the computation. No specific electrical or mechanical
device is specified and generation of the inverse tangent by a digital computer is arguably
within the scope of this claim. It is not until the fourth claim that the invention is narrowed
to specific electronic apparatus.
Although claims such as these have never been tested by Supreme Court scrutiny, they
have survived the Patent Office, thereby affording a presumption of their validity.
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The apparatus patent, notwithstanding its own limitations, is not
subject to these particular weaknesses. This distinction is especially
relevant to mathematical computations wherein certain steps may be
executed in more than one sequence to reach the same final result. No
matter what the sequence of steps, any use of the process on a device
within the scope of the apparatus' claims infringes the patent.
Synergism and Obviousness v. The Mental Process Doctrine
In view of the Benson holding, if there is to be any possibility of
securing Supreme Court approval of a process claim for software, the
process must be distinguished from those previously deemed perform-
able by mere mental steps. 99 The Supreme Court has historically
denied patents to mental processes the subject matter of which was
essentially mere abstract thoughts, ideas, principles, or scientific truths.100
Furthermore, the mere application of a patented machine to a new use
does not per se constitute invention of a process under the patent laws.' 0'
However, if the process and machine synergize to effect a whole greater
than the sum of its constituent parts, an argument favoring patentability
arises. 02
The synergism argument is conventionally applied to find inven-
09 In his first policy statement, Commissioner Brenner distinguished between patent-
able utility processes and non-patentable algorithm processes. See 1966 Guidelines, supra
note 70. In order to differentiate the two, the concepts of the result of a method and the
function of its steps were defined. The result relates to the mathematical transformation of
data, whereas the function concerns "the change in state of certain electrical or mechanical
devices within the computer according to the algorithm .. " 441 F.2d at 865-66. Under
the guideline, a computer program expressed in terms of the functioning of the machine's
components, as opposed to an algorithm, would be classified as a utility process and would,
therefore, be patentable. See 1966 Guidelines, supra note 70.
The value of the above distinction is highly questionable and may have accounted
for its post-hearing deletion. See 1968 Guidelines & note 70 supra.
10o See, e.g., Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of America, 306 U.S. 86, 94,
modified, 306 U.S. 618 (1939); Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 498,
507 (1874); LeRoy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 174-75 (1852).
101 [A] machine of which we were possessed might be applied by every man to
any use of which it is susceptible, and ... this right ought not to be taken from
him and given to a monopolist, because the first perhaps had occasion so to apply
it. Thus a screw for crushing plaster might be employed for crushing corn-cobs.
And a chain-pump for raising water might be used for raising wheat: this being
merely a change of application.
WRNsGS OF TOMAS JEFFERsON, 182-84 (Washington ed.).
The mere function of a patented machine may not be patented as a process. However,
a new process may be patented, notwithstanding that it is performed on a machine.
Chisholm-Ryder Co., Inc. v. Buck, 65 F.2d 735, 736 (4th Cir. 1933). For an extensive
discussion of the "function of a machine" doctrine, distinguishing the patentable function
of a machine from the non-patentable effect of the machine, see In re Tarczy-Hornoch, 397
F.2d 856 (C.C.P.A. 1968).
102 Cf. Anderson's-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., Inc., 896 U.S. 57, 61




tion in a machine composed of a combination of "old" parts and was,
therefore, not before the Benson Court. It is suggested, however, that
had it been presented, it might have provided an analogy sufficient to
distinguish the Benson invention from other non-patentable mathemati-
cal processes capable of execution by a digital computer. Prior to the
Benson discovery, both machines and mathematical formulae were
available to accomplish the process of BCD to binary conversion.10 3
However, general purpose electronic data processing machines could
not perform the process if they lacked either an "adder" capable of
adding multi-digit binary numbers or sufficient circuitry to "store"
conversion factors.10 The Benson discovery combined a known ma-
chine, previously incapable of BCD to binary conversion, with a mathe-
matical relationship heretofore requiring, for its machine utilization,
the addition and storage of multi-digit binary numbers to yield an im-
proved and simplified conversion process. 0 5
It is well settled that a patent may issue to a new process notwith-
standing that it is executed on an old machine. 06 While the synergism
test has, in the past, been principally applied to demonstrate presence
or absence of obviousness, 107 it, like the mental process test, is a crea-
ture of the courts and the reasoning which supports it could be persua-
sive as against the enigmas of the mental process doctrine.
Another test that, in the opinion of the writer of this Note, would
have proven more satisfactory than the mental process analysis actually
applied in Benson is section 103's obviousness standard. Obviousness
was not an issue before the Supreme Court since the sole ground for
rejection of the Benson application was lack of statutory subject matter
under section 101.108 Had the Patent Office instead relied on the non-
obviousness requirements of section 103, the Supreme Court, if it still
chose to grant certiorari, 109 could have reached the same result without
103 The conventional conversion method illustrated supra note 9 is performable on
virtually any general purpose digital computer with multi-digit addition and storage
capabilities. In addition, other conversion means have been patented. See note 96 supra.
104 Brief for Respondent at 6, Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
105Id. at 6-7.
106 See Carnegie Steel Co. v. Cambria Iron Co., 185 U.S. 403, 424-25 (1902); New
Process Fermentation Co. v. Maus, 122 U.S. 413, 428 (1887); Cowles Co. v. Frost-White
Paper Mills, 174 F.2d 868, 870 (2d Cir. 1949).
107 See Anderson's-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., Inc., 396 U.S. 57 (1969).
108 441 F.2d at 684.
109 A rejection for obviousness, overturned by the CCPA, would not have been likely
to command the same degree of attention engendered by the decision based on statutory
subject matter. The question of software patentability per se was one with which the
patent bar and computer industry were greatly concerned and which had never been
before the Court. See note 11 supra. The CCPA's express limitation of its holding to the
issue of statutory subject matter made the case an ideal vehicle by which the Court could
express its policy on the software issue.
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hurdling the inconsistencies attending the mental process doctrine. Al-
though a patentable invention need no longer be the product of a
"flash of genius," 110 it is at least arguable that the manipulation of
numbers contemplated by the Benson claims would have been obvious
to someone with expertise in the applicable arts- viz., mathematics
and computer programming."'
The policy-implementing results of the obviousness analysis and
the mental process test are not dissimilar. Both prevent public depriva-
tion of the benefits of a phenomenon otherwise available absent any
contribution by a would-be patentee. Section 103 recognizes that a non-
obvious discovery would be unlikely to reach the public absent dis-
closure by the inventor and that a patent on it, therefore, deprives the
public of nothing to which it would otherwise have access. 112 Analysis
under the obviousness standard is necessarily conducted on a case-by-
case basis. The mental process doctrine, on the other hand, proceeds
from the assumption that a patent on an abstract idea, by its nature,
creates a monopoly so broad as to preclude use, by another, of a sub-
sequent discovery made without any assistance from the patentee's dis-
closure." 3 Unlike the obviousness test, the mental process doctrine is
as broad and sweeping as the evil it purports to deter.114
Consequences of Benson
The unequivocal Benson ruling that classification as a mental
process is, per se, sufficient grounds for rejection promises to promote
two evils. First, it impedes any incentive to public disclosure of non-
obvious processes which might otherwise never be put to beneficial use
merely because these processes are capable of performance by the
110 See Graham v. John-Deere Co., 883 U.S. 1, 15 (1966); Fisch v. Gould, 246 F.2d 5, 7
(3d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 914 (1958). Section 103 of the 1952 Patent Act codified
the case law on obviousness and, by implication, abolished the famous "flash of genius test"
promulgated in Cuno Eng'r Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84, 91 (1941).
111 Of course, obviousness must be determined as of the time of invention, and not
afterwards. The use of hindsight is not permissible in determining the question of
obviousness. Cf. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc. v. Ray-O-Vac Co., 321 U.S. 275, 279
(1944).
112 Cf. United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 186 (1933); Continental
Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 424 (1908).
113 See 409 U.S. at 68.
As examples of possible uses of the Benson invention, the Court listed operation of a
train, verification of driver's licenses and researching of law books for precedents. Id.
Each of these applications, like dialing a telephone, involves entering multi-digit numbers,
one digit at a time, for electronic data processing. However the mere fact that the Benson
invention is useful in accomplishing these tasks does not preclude their achievement by
other means. It does not, therefore, follow that a patent on the Benson process would
provide the inventor with a monopoly on any of the above operations.
114 The nature and range of mental processes is diverse and wide. See, e.g., notes 29-31
and accompanying text supra. To broadly categorize all processes somehow related to
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human mind. 15 Second, it encourages inventors, in drafting their
claims, to synthesize artificial apparatus by which to camouflage their
inventions for fear of rejection as mental processes. 1 6 A strict applica-
tion of the more discriminatory non-obviousness requirement could
eliminate the difficulties encountered in application of the mental
process doctrine. 17
Rather than alleviating the confusion which has pervaded the issue
of software patentability, the Court's reasoning in Benson may have
added to it. A review of the cases through Benson shows that, in
general, processes held patentable have satisfied one of the following
three criteria:
(1) the process is executed on a specific physical apparatus;"18
(2) the chemical and/or physical phenomena which govern the
process place suitable limitations upon it;119 or
mental steps as non-patentable, without consideration of the individual merits of each, is
to discard the baby with the bath water. Often, what on its surface appears to be principally
a mental process, is not. This error is all too frequently made with respect to computer
processes. See Bender, Computer Programs: Should They Be Patentable?, 68 CoLUr. L. REv.
241, 257 (1968).
115 See Bender, Computer Programs, supra note 114, at 244-48.
116 PanmET4r's Comas'N, supra note 85, at 13. On April 8, 1965, the President's Com-
mission on the Patent System was organized to examine the United States patent system
in view of the then current state of technology, and to make appropriate recommendations
for modernizing the system. Exec. Order No. 11,215, 3 C.F.R. 299 (1965). The Commission
addressed itself, inter alia, to the problem of software patentability. It expressly criticized
inventors' attempts to circumvent the non-statutory subject matter bar to patentability by
drafting software claims as processes on programmed machines. To alleviate this problem,
the Commission recommended statutory language which would exclude such claims from
the scope of patentable subject matter. The following language was suggested:
The classes of patentable subject matter shall continue as at present except:
3. A series of instructions which control or condition the operation of a data
processing machine, generally referred to as a "program," shall not be considered
patentable regardless of whether the program is claimed as: (a) an article, (b) a
process described in terms of the operations performed by a machine pursuant
to a program, or (c) one or more machine configurations established by a program.
PnSmmENT's Comm'N at 12.
The administration's attempt to implement the Commission's recommendations
through appropriate legislation appears to have failed. Although legislation barring
patents for computer programs was introduced in both houses (see S. 1042, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1967); H.R. 5924, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967)), the bills were revised and the most
recent Senate version made no reference to the software patentability problem. See S. 643,
92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
137 Any monopoly granted for non-obvious mental processes could be further limited
to prohibit only commercial exploitation by creation of an exception analogous to the
court-created fair use doctrine applied in conjunction with the copyright laws. See 2
NiMsLER ON COPYRIGHT § 145 (1972). For a proposed legislative solution to the software
protection problem which borrows from the copyright laws, see Galbi, Proposal for New
Legislation to Protect Computer Programming, 17 Bu.. COPYRIGHT So!eY 280 (1970).
118 See, e.g., The Telephone Cases, 126 U.S. 1 (1887).
119 See, e.g., Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 252 (1853).
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(3) the process operates on a physical object so as to change it to
a different physical state .120
However, these enumerated criteria offer little guidance to the
potential software patentee. Satisfaction of one of the above criteria is
no guarantee of patentable subject matter. For example, claim eight of
the Benson application limited the process to implementation on a re-
entrant shift register.121 Failure to meet any of these criteria does not,
on the other hand, necessarily exclude a process from the realm of
patentable subject matter. For, as the Benson Court expressly stated:
We do not hold that no process patent could ever qualify if it did
not meet the requirements of our prior precedents. 122
This residue of uncertainty evinces the serious drawbacks of the mental
process doctrine which would have been better left to fade into obscu-
rity.
CONCLUSION
The majority opinion in Benson was the sole opinion. There were
no concurrences nor did any of the six participating Justices dissent.
Why there was so little room for disagreement among Justices who have
rarely hesitated to express varying and diverse views on the legal ques-
tions presented to them is subject to speculation. The lack of concur-
ring or dissenting opinions is particularly curious in light of the fact
that the five CCPA judges had unanimously reached the opposite con-
clusion.
In examining the treatment that the Court accorded its first soft-
ware patent case and in projecting its effect upon future similar situa-
tions, it is important to distinguish two basic issues. One is the policy
question of whether computer processes, a class of inventions of which
the Benson discovery is but one example, should be afforded the pro-
tection of the patent laws. In contrast is the question of whether the
Benson invention is, per se, patentable under the currently applicable
Patent Act of 1952. The former is an issue for the legislature to resolve.
It is only the latter question which the courts have jurisdiction to deter-
mine. Notwithstanding the severability of these two issues, the Court
confounded the two, thereby permitting its attention to be diverted
from the merits of the Benson claims vis-4-vis the 1952 Act. Unlike the
CCPA, the Supreme Court devoted little space to consideration of the
details of the claims in issue. It made no distinction between the two
120 See, e.g., Expanded Metal Co. v. Bradford, 214 U.S. 366 (1908).
121 See note 65 supra.
122 409 U.S. at 71.
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claims. No significance was attributed to the fact that one claim was
restricted to signals processed on a re-entrant shift register (thereby at
least arguably removing it from the mental process proscription) while
the other was couched in more abstract terms.123
Instead of applying the law enunciated by the Patent Act and the
consistent line of software cases decided thereunder,124 the Court ex-
pressed apprehension over the Patent Office's present ability to handle
an increased workload and cast its opinion in the mold of executive
committee proposals for future legislation.
The circular reasoning by which the Court found itself incompe-
tent to apply Patent Act protection to software was based on the falla-
cious premise that the Act excludes computer processes from its scope.
"It may be that the patent laws should be extended to cover these pro-
grams,"'1 25 Justice Douglas wrote for the majority while concluding that
this was "a policy matter to which we are not competent to speak.' 120
The software issue cannot, however, be dismissed with such a blithe as-
sumption of nonpatentability since the currently applicable patent stat-
ute makes express provision for process patents.127 The additional re-
quirement of confinement to a specific apparatus which the courts have
engrafted on the process provision was clearly met in claim eight. There-
fore, it was the Court's function to explain why computer programs do
not fall within the "process" category listed in the Patent Act. In as-
suming as a premise the very rule it sought to prove the Court failed in
its mission.
The unanimity of the presiding Justices is best attributed to ap-
prehension over the ramifications attending an opinion favorable to the
validity of software patents. It is true that little doubt exists that an
affirmative resolution of the issue would be followed by a substantial
influx of software applications to the Patent Office. Assuming arguendo
123 The claims in issue appear to have been the product of a conscious effort to avoid
the use of language referring to "numbers." Nowhere in claim eight did the word "number"
appear. Instead the term "signals" was used where "numbers" might otherwise have been
satisfactory. In claim 18, the broader of the two, the process was not expressly limited to
execution on any specific apparatus. The draftsman of the claims, apparently considering
the term "signals" too limiting in this context, spoke of binary and binary coded decimal
"number representations," using "numbers" in its adjectival rather than nounal sense.
Claims couched in terms of electrical signals permit analogy to other electrical processes
which have been held patentable, e.g., radio and telephone communications. Furthermore,
this type of presentation invites consideration in a context not normally associated with
mental steps. Although this approach has achieved success when presented to the CCPA,
the Supreme Court was not similarly disposed.
124 See notes 33-82 and accompanying text supra.
125 409 U.S. at 72 (emphasis added).
126 Id.
127 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1970).
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that this would necessitate development of new classification and search
techniques as well as expansion of the Patent Office labor force and
facilities, these factors, no matter how distracting, should not govern
judicial decision in an area preempted by statute.
Aware of the potentially broad economic consequences of an affir-
mance and fearful of assuming responsibility for the attending repercus-
sions, the Court took the position most akin to the status quo. In so
doing, it contravened its express belief that Congress is the govern-
mental branch best suited to determine the software patentability ques-
tion. Taking the path of least resistance, the Court not only permitted
conjectured Patent Office inconvenience to becloud a determination on
the merits but also usurped authority delegated exclusively to Congress.
Of what consequence is the Benson decision on the issue of soft-
ware patentability? As a model to which future cases may be analogized,
it is deficient for lack of analysis and, as an expression of the current
law, it is inconsistent with the legislature's exercise of its constitution-
ally mandated authority. The holding will, of course, have precedential
value when the software patent issue is again litigated in the courts be-
low. However, it will be the Court's supervisory power rather than its
appellate wisdom that will dictate future results. The CCPA, in partic-
ular, after devoting substantial judicial effort to the formulation of a
body of law consistent with both the pre-software "method" cases and
the Patent Act, must now feel constrained to reverse its stance absent
any rational legal basis for so doing other than its inferior position in
the judicial hierarchy.
The arguments, both pro and con, over the advisability of patent-
ing software have been given more than ample space in the relevant
literature12 and have, therefore, not been re-analyzed here. The patent
bar and software developers have proffered sound reasons favoring soft-
ware patents and the hardware manufacturers have pressed equally
sound opposing arguments. However, if there are to be any limitations
on the scope of inventions which may be afforded protection as pro-
cesses under the express provisions of the Patent Act, Congress must
enact them. The confusing debris of scattered precedent that Benson
leaves in its wake mandates an unequivocal congressional declaration
on the subject of software patentability. 129
_ Howard F. Mandelbaum
128 See, e.g., Note, Protecting Proprietary Rights of Computer Programs: The Need
for New Legislative Protection, 21 CATHOLIC U.L. REv. 181 (1971); Note, Computer Pro-
grams: Should They Be Patentable?, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 241 (1968); Note, Computer
Programs and Proposed Revisions of the Patent and Copyright Laws, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1541
(1968).




As this article goes to press the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals has just handed down its first post-Benson decision excluding
mathematical formulas and mental processes from the realm of statu-
tory subject matter. In In re Christensen, 178 U.S.P.Q. 35 (C.C.P.A.
1973), the court, constrained by Benson, affirmed the Patent Office's
rejection of claims on a process for determining subsurface porosity
while obviating the necessity for removal and direct measurement of
core samples.
The forecasted confusion over the Supreme Court's inadequate
analysis of the Benson claims is no longer prophesy:
The Supreme Court in Benson appears to have held that claims
drafted in such terms are not patentable - for what reason remain-
ing a mystery. Under the rules of the legal game, we are obliged to
follow its lead as best we can.
But for the Benson decision, I would reverse the rejection
here ....
Id. at 39 (Rich, J., concurring).
presently available protection of the copyright laws have been rejected as inadequate.
Computer programs are susceptible to translation into other programming and machine
languages, rearrangement of steps, and various other alterations which, under the copyright
laws, might permit theft of a software invention's substance without adoption of its
form. See generally Felsman, Crisman, Hope, Holde" & Medlock, Computer Program
Protection, 84 TExAs BJ. 83, 85-40, 58 (1971); Note, Computer Programs and Proposed
Revisions of the Patent and Copyright Laws, 81 HAav. L. Rav. 1541, 1550 (1968). Patent
law precludes similar theft of an invention's substance through use of the doctrine of
equivalents. See Comment, Infringement and Assembly Abroad-Patent Protection Takes a
Vacation in Deepsouth, 47 ST. JOHN's L. Rav. at 662 & nn.84-87 (1973).
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